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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Appellant Jonathan Geftman ("Geftman") appeals from a 
decision of the United States Tax Court entered March 17, 
1997, holding him liable for an income tax deficiency and 
for additions to tax due to his failure to report as taxable 
income a distribution he received from a trust established 
by his late father Raymond Geftman. The Tax Court entered 
its decision pursuant to its opinion filed September 30, 
1996, as amended by an order of December 23, 1996. The 
Tax Court had jurisdiction under 26 U.S.C. #8E8E # 7442, 
6213(a) and 6214 based on Geftman's timely filing of a 
petition contesting a Notice of Deficiency issued to him on 
July 3, 1991, pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 6212. Appellate 
jurisdiction rests on 26 U.S.C. S 7482(a)(1). Venue is proper 
pursuant to 26 U.S.C. S 7482(b)(1)(A), as Geftman resided 
within this Circuit when he filed his petition contesting the 
notice of deficiency. For the reasons that follow, we will 
reverse the Tax Court's decision, thus vacating the tax 
deficiency and the additions to tax imposed on Geftman. 
 
II. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 
A. The Trusts 
 
Raymond Geftman died on February 28, 1983, leaving a 
will which provided that its "primary purpose" was "to 
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provide for the benefit of " his son Jonathan Geftman, the 
taxpayer-appellant in this case, who was 14 years old at 
the time of his father's death. The will further provided that 
"[n]o action should be taken . . . which would unreasonably 
detract from [Geftman's] ability to receive the maximum 
income and principal to which he is entitled." The will 
established three trusts, designated A, B, and C, to be 
funded from the residuary estate with Trust A receiving 40 
percent of the residuary estate and Trusts B and C each 
receiving 30 percent. 
 
As specified in the will, Geftman was the sole beneficiary 
of Trust C and the decedent's fiancee, Edith Kermer, was 
the sole income beneficiary of Trust B, while the income 
beneficiaries of Trust A included the decedent's accountant 
Steven Love, his real estate agent Warren Welt, his 
bookkeeper Paul Creedy, and several of their relatives. The 
will named Love, Welt and Creedy, along with the 
decedent's attorneys, Terrence Russell and Jonathan Beloff, 
as personal representatives of the estate ("representatives"), 
trustees of the trusts, and directors of Berkley Mortgage 
Corporation ("Berkley") and BOP, Inc. ("BOP"), real estate 
development enterprises the estate owned. 
 
The will authorized the trustees to make distributions to 
Geftman from Trust C's current income or from its 
principal, to the extent "necessary for his health, support, 
maintenance and education," including higher education 
and the cost of establishing him in a business or 
profession. Geftman then would receive the remaining 
principal of Trust C in installments beginning at age 30 or 
upon his admission to the bar, if earlier. 
 
In contrast to these terms governing distributions to 
Geftman from Trust C, the will prohibited distributions 
from the principal of Trusts A or B, and provided that 
Trusts A and B were to make the specified distributions to 
their beneficiaries only to the extent that the trusts had 
current net income after expenses.1 The remainders of 
Trusts A and B after these trusts had made all specified 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Several beneficiaries of Trust A were to receive distributions for life 
while the others were to receive distributions only until age 25. 
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distributions were to be added to the principal of Trust C 
for Geftman's benefit. See app. at 127-30. 
 
B. The Margin Transactions 
 
In August 1983 the estate funded the trusts by 
transferring tax-exempt municipal bonds worth 
approximately $3 million to brokerage accounts held in the 
name of the trusts through the E.F. Hutton and 
PaineWebber brokerage firms. See app. at 130-32. Because 
the estate had not settled all of its liabilities, the personal 
representatives required all beneficiaries of the trusts to 
execute consents permitting the estate to recall all trust 
assets to the estate as necessary to satisfy the estate's 
obligations, even if the recall completely depleted the trusts.2 
 
In December 1983 the estate entered into a Settlement 
Agreement resolving lawsuits pending against it. During the 
same month, the trusts began brokerage borrowing on 
margin at rates of 11.50% to 13.25% using their municipal 
bond assets as collateral and transferring the funds 
borrowed to the estate. See app. at 178-92; 131. The trusts 
borrowed $74,950.97 in December 1983, see app. at 154, 
$870,000 on January 5, 1984, see app. at 192, and 
$300,000 on January 9, 1984, see app. at 152, for a total 
of $1,244,950.97 by January 9. On January 17, 1984, the 
representatives met and issued the following memorandum 
of their meeting: 
 
       The Settlement Agreement . . . was ratified. . . . 
 
       The actions necessary to pay or transfer estate assets 
       needed for the settlement was also ratified, however, 
       there was lengthy discussion on the issue as to the 
       ratification of the borrowing from the stockbroker by 
       using trust assets as collateral as opposed to the sale 
       of estate assets to pay the sums due for the settlement. 
       The action which had been taken to borrow was 
       ratified, however it was acknowledged that Paul Creedy 
       had dissented from the decision to borrow for purposes 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. Because Geftman was a minor, his mother executed his consent in her 
capacity as his legal guardian. 
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       of carrying out the settlement agreement, however Paul 
       Creedy agreed to the ratification of the action. 
 
App. at 135a. The estate received additional transfers from 
the trusts during 1984 for a total of $2,850,408 as of 
August 31, 1984, which represented the maximum amount 
that could be borrowed on margin against the trusts' $3 
million municipal bond collateral. See app. at 131. 
 
The trusts' E.F. Hutton account statements reflected the 
monthly interest which the broker charged on the margin 
loans. On the statements for the months of April through 
July 1984, handwritten notations indicated that a portion 
of the margin interest charges was attributable to the 
amounts forwarded to the estate while a portion was 
attributable to funds which the trusts lent to Edith Kermer. 
See app. at 160-99. The loan to Edith Kermer was secured 
by a first mortgage in favor of the trusts and was repayable 
pursuant to the terms of an installment note which 
provided for monthly payments of principal plus interest at 
a rate of 1% above the rate charged to the trusts by E.F. 
Hutton. See app. at 416. 
 
On four occasions the estate paid the trusts an amount 
equal to the notation on the prior month's statement 
indicating the amount of margin interest attributable to the 
estate. During the period from April through August 1984, 
the handwritten notations and corresponding payments 
were as follows: 
 
Statement      Notation of Estate's        Deposit Into 
Date           Share of Interest           Account 
 
4/84           $16,086                     -- 
5/84           $20,538                     $16,086 
6/84           $21,580                     $20,538 
7/84           $24,560                     $21,580 
8/84           --                          $24,560 
__________________________________________________ 
 
total          $82,764                     $82,764 
 
See Geftman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 816, 818 
(1996); app. at 179, 181, 183, 185, 187. 
 
C. The Mortgage Transactions 
 
The representatives, including those who served as 
officers and directors of Berkley and BOP, met on 
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September 5, 1984, regarding Berkley's and BOP's 
condominium development ventures, including ventures 
known as "La Playa" and "Blue Grass." The representatives 
determined that because a financing arrangement for the 
La Playa condominium development had fallen through, it 
was necessary for the trusts to sell their municipal bonds 
and transfer the proceeds to Berkley and BOP. The bonds 
were sold for a capital loss of approximately $100,000 and 
the proceeds were used to satisfy the margin debt owed to 
E.F. Hutton. According to the memorandum of the 
September 5 meeting, the remaining proceeds from the sale 
of the bonds were transferred to La Playa "as a down 
payment for the purchase of all new first mortgages . . . on 
the La Playa units." App. at 135a-b. 
 
A memorandum dated February 4, 1985, indicated that 
the trusts had acquired the La Playa mortgages, although 
Berkley would hold the title to them. The memorandum 
stated that, 
 
       the prior action[s] taken with regard to Trust A, B and 
       C . . . were confirmed . . . . Approximately $2,000,000 
       in first mortgages at LaPlaya have been bought 
       outright by the Trust . . . . Title to the mortgages[was] 
       taken in the name of Berkley Mortgage Corp. as 
       collection agent for the Trust . . . . The balance of Trust 
       assets for approximately $1,000,000 has been used to 
       buy mortgages from BOP, Inc. which were also taken in 
       Berkley's name as collection agent. 
 
App. at 135c. The trusts' books did not reflect a purchase 
of the mortgages corresponding to the transaction described 
in the February 4, 1985 memorandum. However, "adjusting 
journal entries" recorded on June 11, 1985, after the trusts' 
tax year ended on February 28, 1985, indicated that the 
trusts had received $2,029,390 in La Playa condominium 
mortgages from the estate as a "partial debt settlement." 
Supp. app. at 40.3 
 
A document entitled "Berkley Mortgage Corp. Accrued 
Interest and Principal Collections" set forth cumulative 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The estate's tax year ended March 31 while the trusts' ended February 
28. 
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totals of the principal and interest which Berkley received 
on the La Playa and Blue Grass mortgages for the tax year 
ended February 28, 1985, and for the "Ten Months Ended 
12/31/85." The document indicated that Berkley had 
collected $90,595.81 in payments on mortgages at the La 
Playa and Blue Grass developments, and attributed these 
amounts to the trusts. See supp. app. at 39. One of the 
representatives testified that the document was prepared no 
earlier than December 31, 1985, ten months after the end 
of the tax year. See supp. app. at 33. 
 
Berkley intermittently transferred funds to the trusts as 
follows: 
 
       Oct. 17, 1984                $12,000 
       Nov. 9, 1984                 $ 5,000 
       Jan. 4, 1985                 $25,000 
       Jan. 29, 1985                $ 1,000 
       Feb. 5, 1985                 $14,000 
       Feb. 14, 1985                $ 1,000 
       Feb. 20, 1985                $ 1,000 
       ____________________________________ 
       Total                        $59,000.4 
 
The trusts recorded their receipt of these transfers under 
an account entitled "Berkley Mtg. Co." App. at 384-85. 
 
On June 16, 1985, Berkley assigned the La Playa and 
Blue Grass mortgages to Ohio Savings Bank to secure a 
$1.8 million loan to Berkley and BOP. Berkley represented 
that it was the "sole and lawful owner" of the mortgages 
"free and clear of any and all claims and liens," and that it 
possessed "the full right and lawful authority to deliver, 
pledge, assign, grant, convey and transfer" the mortgages 
as security for the loan. App. at 390. 
 
On July 30, 1986, Ohio Savings Bank reassigned the 
mortgages to Berkley, and on August 15, 1986, Berkley 
sold the mortgages to Horowitz Finance Corporation and 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. In the computerized general ledger the first two payments of $12,000 
and $5,000, which were recorded separately in the handwritten journal, 
were consolidated into one $17,000 payment. An additional $10,000 
payment was recorded and then reversed, as it occurred after the end of 
the fiscal year. See app. at 382-88. 
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Fleet National Bank. The closing documents identify 
Berkley and BOP as the sellers and Horowitz and Fleet as 
the purchasers. Berkley and BOP used the proceeds of the 
sale to satisfy the prior loan from Ohio Savings Bank. See 
app. at 398-407; 73. In December 1987 the estate formally 
exercised its right to recall the assets it had conveyed to the 
trusts, and eventually recalled all trust assets due to the 
estate's poor cash position. See app. at 135g-i. 
 
D. Distributions and Tax Returns 
 
The estate reported no distributable net income ("DNI") 
for fiscal years 1984 and 1985.5 For tax year 1984 the 
estate reported negative taxable income of $860,171 and 
incurred actual losses of $369,517. For tax year 1985 the 
estate reported negative taxable income of $379,955 and 
incurred actual losses of $327,946. 
 
The trustees, who were also representatives of the estate, 
did not file any Form 1041 Fiduciary Income Tax Returns 
and did not report any interest income for the tax year 
ended February 28, 1984. For the tax year ended February 
28, 1985, the trustees filed a Form 1041 for each of the 
trusts, but filed them in February 1986, nine months after 
they were due. The Form 1041 for Trust C reported that 
Trust C had received $101,890 in DNI during fiscal year 
1985, consisting of Trust C's 30% share of the trusts' tax- 
exempt municipal bond interest and its 30% share of the 
transfers made to the trusts in connection with the E.F. 
Hutton margin advances and the La Playa and Blue Grass 
mortgage holdings. Although the Form 1041 indicated that 
the entire $101,890 had been distributed to Geftman, only 
$46,936 actually was distributed while the rest remained in 
an E.F. Hutton account to which neither Geftman nor his 
legal guardian had access. See app. at 135, 216-20.6 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. The Distributable Net Income of an estate or a trust determines the 
amount that a beneficiary receiving a distribution from the estate or 
trust must include in the beneficiary's gross income. See 26 U.S.C. 
S 662(a). DNI generally consists of the taxable income of the estate or 
trust, subject to certain modifications. See  26 U.S.C. S 643(a). 
 
6. The Schedules K-1 attached to the Form 1041 for Trust A indicated 
that Love, Welt, and Creedy each received trust distributions of $13,136. 
See app. at 206-08. 
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Geftman, who received only $2,620 in income apart from 
the trust distribution, see app. at 126, did not file an 
income tax return for 1985. On July 3, 1991, the 
Commissioner of Internal Revenue ("Commissioner") issued 
Geftman a Notice of Deficiency finding him liable for an 
income tax deficiency of $13,043 on the grounds that 
$48,693 of the $101,890 distribution reported on the Form 
1041 was taxable. The Commissioner also imposed 
additions to tax due to Geftman's failure to file a return or 
pay estimated tax on the distributions. See app. at 137-39. 
 
Geftman filed a timely petition in the United States Tax 
Court contesting the asserted deficiency and additions to 
tax. He contended that his entire distribution from Trust C, 
which the Commissioner now stipulates totaled $46,936 
rather than $101,890, was non-taxable pursuant to 26 
U.S.C. S 662(b) and Treas. Reg. S 1.662(b)-1 because, 
contrary to the trustees' representations on the Form 1041, 
all of the income to Trust C was non-taxable. According to 
Geftman, the trustees had mischaracterized the transfers 
from the estate as taxable interest income paid to the trusts 
in their capacity as creditors in the margin loan 
transactions and as holders of the La Playa and Blue Grass 
mortgages when in reality those transfers constituted non- 
taxable distributions to the trusts as beneficiaries of an 
estate which did not have any distributable net income. See 
26 U.S.C. S 662(a). 
 
E. The Tax Court Opinion 
 
Following a three-day trial held in December 1995, the 
Tax Court issued a Memorandum Opinion dated September 
30, 1996, rejecting Geftman's contentions and finding that 
the transfers from the estate constituted taxable income to 
the trusts. Geftman v. Commissioner, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) 816 
(1996). The court found that the $82,764 transferred to the 
trusts in connection with the E.F. Hutton margin borrowing 
constituted taxable interest income arising from a bona fide 
debtor-creditor relationship between the estate and the 
trusts. Id. at 821. The court also found that the $90,596 in 
mortgage payments which Berkley collected on the La Playa 
and Blue Grass mortgages constituted interest income to 
the trusts because the trusts "clearly owned" the La Playa 
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and Blue Grass mortgages. Id. at 821-22. Thus, the court 
concluded, because a portion of the income to the trusts 
was taxable, a like proportion of the trusts' distribution to 
Geftman was taxable. See 26 U.S.C. S 662(b); Treas. Reg. 
S 1.662(b)-1. 
 
Geftman filed a timely motion for reconsideration 
pursuant to Rule 161 of the Rules of Practice and 
Procedure of the Tax Court, pointing out that Berkley had 
transferred to the trusts only $59,000 of the $90,596 in 
mortgage income it had attributed to the trusts. In an order 
dated December 23, 1996, the Tax Court granted the 
motion, recognizing that the trusts had received only 
$59,000 of the $90,596 which the court had characterized 
as mortgage interest income in its September 30, 1996 
opinion. 
 
Based on this corrected amount, the Tax Court found 
that Trust C had earned $118,251 in distributable net 
income and that 36% of this amount, consisting of Trust 
C's 30% share of the $82,764 margin loan interest and of 
the $59,000 mortgage interest, was taxable while the 
remainder was non-taxable interest on the municipal bonds.7 
Applying the character rule, which provides that a 
distribution from a trust is taxable in the same proportion 
that the trust's income is taxable, see 26 U.S.C. S 662(b); 
Treas. Reg. S 1.662(b)-1, the court found that 36% of 
Geftman's $46,936 distribution was taxable and issued a 
final order assessing an income tax deficiency of $2,638.00 
and imposing additions to tax totaling $810.50 for 
Geftman's failure to file a timely return and pay estimated 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. The court computed these amounts as follows, based on Trust C's 
30% share of the trusts' net assets: 
 
        30% x $82,764 taxable margin transaction income   = $24,829  
       +30% x $59,000 taxable mortgage transaction income = $17,700  
       __________________________________________________   _______ 
        total taxable income                                $42,529  
 
        total taxable income                              = $42,529  
       +30% x $252,406 tax-exempt municipal bond income   = $75,722  
       ________________________________________________     _______ 
        net income to Trust C                             = $118,251 
 
        $42,529 taxable income ö $118,251 net income      = 36%    
 
See app. at 436-37. 
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tax as required under 26 U.S.C. SS 6651 and 6654. See 
app. at 436-38.8 
 
Geftman timely filed this appeal. We review the Tax 
Court's factual findings for clear error, but exercise plenary 
review of its conclusions of law. Fredericks v. Commissioner, 
126 F.3d 433, 436 (3d Cir. 1997).9 The taxpayer bears the 
burden of proving the error in the deficiency assessed 
against him. See Welch v. Helvering, 290 U.S. 111, 115, 54 
S.Ct. 8, 9 (1933); Cebollero v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d 986, 
990 (4th Cir. 1992).10 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
8. Thirty-six percent of Geftman's $46,936 distribution equals $16,897. 
The Tax Court calculated Geftman's tax liability on $16,428 but did not 
explain the $469 discrepancy. See app. at 436-37. However, the court's 
calculation of Geftman's ultimate tax liability is not germane to our 
analysis. 
 
9. While the determinations as to whether the transaction gave rise to a 
bona fide debt and whether the trusts owned the mortgages could be 
considered to be findings of "ultimate fact," we have held that "we no 
longer recognize the ultimate fact exception to the standard that factual 
findings are reviewed only for clear error." Pleasant Summit Land Corp. 
v. Commissioner, 863 F.2d 263, 268 (3d Cir. 1988) (citing American Home 
Prods. Corp. v. Barr Labs., Inc., 834 F.2d 368, 370 n.2 (3d Cir. 1987)). 
 
10. Geftman contends, br. at 17, that the burden of proof should have 
been shifted to the Commissioner because Geftman demonstrated that 
the Commissioner's determination of a deficiency arbitrarily and 
erroneously rested on a Form 1041 which inaccurately reported that 
Trust C had distributed $101,890 instead of $46,936 to him. See 
Cebollero v. Commissioner, 967 F.2d at 990; Portillo v. Commissioner, 932 
F.2d 1128, 1133 (5th Cir. 1991); Anastasato v. Commissioner, 794 F.2d 
884, 887 (3d Cir. 1986). However, where the burden is shifted to the 
Commissioner, the Commissioner only need satisfy a burden of going 
forward by presenting some evidence of the taxpayer's liability; the 
"ultimate burden of proof or persuasion remains with the Taxpayer." 
Anastasato, 794 F.2d at 887. Because the record contains sufficient 
evidence to satisfy the Commissioner's burden of going forward, but 
more importantly clearly satisfies Geftman's ultimate burden of proving 
that the deficiency was assessed in error, we need not address Geftman's 
argument that the Tax Court improperly allocated him the burden of 
proof. 
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III. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Margin Interest Transactions 
 
The Tax Court's conclusion that a portion of Geftman's 
distribution from Trust C was taxable rested in significant 
part on its finding that the $82,764 which the estate paid 
to the trusts in connection with the margin advances 
constituted taxable interest income which the trusts 
received in their "capacity as creditor rather than 
beneficiary of the estate." Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821. 
This finding, in turn, rested on the court's determination 
that the $2.85 million which the trusts transferred to the 
estate gave rise to a bona fide debt owed by the estate to 
the trusts. See id. 
 
For "disbursements to constitute true loans there must 
have been, at the time the funds were transferred, an 
unconditional obligation on the part of the transferee to 
repay the money, and an unconditional intention on the 
part of the transferor to secure repayment." Haag v. 
Commissioner, 88 T.C. 604, 615-16 (1987), aff 'd, 855 F.2d 
855 (8th Cir. 1988) (table); accord Saigh v. Commissioner, 
36 T.C. 395, 419 (1961). In the absence of direct evidence 
of intent, the nature of the transaction may be inferred 
from its objective characteristics, see Haag, 88 T.C. at 616, 
including the presence or absence of debt instruments, 
collateral, interest provisions, repayment schedules or 
deadlines, book entries recording loan balances or interest 
payments, actual repayments, and any other attributes 
indicative of an enforceable obligation to repay the sums 
advanced. See Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United States, 398 
F.2d 694, 696 (3d Cir. 1968). 
 
Where, as here, the transactions occur between related 
entities rather than at arms' length, they are "subject to 
particular scrutiny because the control element suggests 
the opportunity to contrive a fictional debt." In re Uneco, 
Inc., 532 F.2d 1204, 1207 (8th Cir. 1976) (citations and 
internal quotations omitted). Thus, a transaction must be 
measured against "an objective test of economic reality" and 
characterized as a bona fide loan only if its"intrinsic 
economic nature" is that of a genuine indebtedness. Fin 
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Hay, 398 F.2d at 697. In light of these principles, we must 
consider whether the evidence as to the contemporaneous 
intent at the time of the transfers and the objective 
attributes and economic realities of the transaction between 
the trusts and the estate support the Tax Court's 
conclusion that the transactions gave rise to a bonafide 
debt. 
 
1. Contemporaneous Intent 
 
The Tax Court acknowledged that a transfer will be 
characterized as a bona fide loan if " `at the time the funds 
were transferred, [there was] an unconditional intention on 
the part of the transferee to repay the money, and an 
unconditional intention on the part of the transferor to 
secure repayment.' " Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 820 
(quoting Haag, 88 T.C. at 616). The court found that the 
January 17, 1984 memorandum memorializing the lawsuit 
Settlement Agreement which referred to "borrowing from 
the stockbroker" by "using the trusts assets as collateral" 
constituted evidence of the requisite intent. Id . at 821. We 
disagree.11 
 
The "determinative fact is the intention as it existed at 
the time of the transaction." Saigh, 36 T.C. at 420. While 
the Tax Court stated that the January 17 memorandum 
was "followed by" a transfer of funds from the trusts to the 
estate, Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821, it did not 
acknowledge that by the time of the January 17 meeting, 
the trusts already had borrowed almost $1.25 million in 
brokerage loans and had transferred funds to the estate 
with no statements from either entity as to the intended 
nature of those transfers. The Commissioner asserts, br. at 
25, that the January 17 meeting merely "ratified" an 
intention existing at the time of the initial transfers. 
However, the memorandum of that meeting indicates that 
the issue of whether to borrow was the subject of"lengthy 
discussion" and "dissent" among the estate's 
representatives. Although the memorandum states that the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. The parties stipulated that this memorandum constitutes the "only 
written evidence of indebtedness reflecting any debt due from the Estate 
to the Trusts." App. at 134. 
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representatives were able to agree by the end of that 
meeting, the ongoing dissent as of January 17 reveals that 
the representatives had not formed the requisite 
unconditional intention to enter into a debt transaction as 
of December 1983 when the transfers began. 
 
Courts have refused to credit statements of intent made 
after the time of the transfer even where the statements 
consist of formal resolutions establishing the precise terms 
of a debt. See Georgiou v. Commissioner, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 
1341, 1350-51 (1995). In Saigh, 36 T.C. 395, the court 
rejected the assertion that there was a debt because funds 
had been transferred between a subsidiary and a parent 
corporation and, as in this case, "at that time nothing was 
said concerning the nature of the transfer." Id. at 419. 
Although the transferor's directors then authorized a loan 
consisting in part of the sums already transferred and the 
transferee then executed a secured note payable to the 
transferor on demand at a specified interest rate, the court 
found this evidence of intent insufficient as it was not 
contemporaneous with the initial transfer. As the court 
explained, the parties had been undecided as to the nature 
of the transaction at its inception, and this indecision 
"affirmatively dismisses the possibility that on the date of 
transfer there was an unconditional intention on the part of 
the transferee . . . and . . . the transferor to secure 
repayment." Id. Similarly, in this case neither the trusts nor 
the estate expressed the requisite intent to enter into a loan 
transaction at the time of the initial transfer, and the 
evidence that the estate's representatives remained 
undecided during the following month precludes us from 
finding that they had formed an unconditional intention as 
the transfers commenced in December 1983.12 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The Commissioner asserts that one of the representatives testified 
that "a loan . . . was intended from the outset." Br. at 29 (citing app. 
at 
15, supp. app. at 3-5, 10). The record does not support this assertion. 
The cited testimony simply describes the transactions in retrospect as 
"loans" and "borrowing" without clarifying whether the intent to borrow 
existed at the time the transfers were made. Wefind nothing in the 
record suggesting that the intent to create an enforceable debt existed as 
of December 1983. 
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The Commissioner contends, br. at 28-29, that this case 
is distinguishable from Saigh because any indecision at the 
January 17 meeting arose from uncertainty over whether to 
proceed with a loan "as opposed to the sale of estate 
assets," and therefore involved a debate between two 
distinct transactions, whereas in Saigh the parties were 
considering two different characterizations of the same 
transaction. Thus, the Commissioner argues, in contrast to 
Saigh where the parties could have remained undecided 
while making the transfer, in this case the very fact of the 
transfer reveals that the estate had opted to borrow instead 
of selling estate assets. We find this distinction 
unpersuasive. 
 
The mere fact that a transfer occurred does not establish 
whether that transfer was intended as a bona fide loan with 
the requisite unconditional intention to repay. See Haag, 84 
T.C. at 616. While the transaction clearly did not entail a 
sale of estate assets, the fact that it involved a transfer is 
not sufficient to establish that the transfer may be 
characterized as a bona fide loan for tax purposes. In the 
absence of any evidence that the transfer was intended at 
its inception to create an unconditional obligation to repay 
the sums transferred, we cannot infer that, simply because 
there was a transfer, a bona fide indebtedness was created. 
 
Even if the intentions expressed in the January 17 
memorandum could be viewed as reasonably 
contemporaneous with the initial transfer, those intentions 
are not sufficient to support a finding of an intent to create 
a bona fide debtor-creditor relationship between the estate 
and the trusts. The memorandum's only allusion to 
borrowing refers to "borrowing from the stockbroker by 
using trust assets as collateral." App. at 135a. This 
statement reflects only the undisputed fact that significant 
sums were borrowed from the stockbroker, E.F. Hutton, 
and then advanced from the trusts to the estate. It does not 
illuminate whether the trusts, in transferring the borrowed 
sums to the estate, intended those transfers to be bona fide 
loans subject to an unconditional obligation to repay or 
whether the estate intended to be bound by an 
unconditional obligation to repay the advances. The 
January 17 memorandum, therefore, cannot be construed 
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as evidence of a contemporaneous, unconditional intent to 
create a bona fide debt owed by the estate to the trusts. 
Because this document constitutes the only evidence in the 
record purporting to express the intent behind the 
transactions, and because this document indicates that the 
requisite intent had not been formed at the relevant time, 
the record cannot support the Tax Court's finding that the 
estate and the trusts intended at the time of the initial 
transfer to create an unconditional debt. 
 
2. Objective Indicia of Indebtedness 
 
The necessary intent to create a bona fide indebtedness 
can be inferred not only from expressions of the parties' 
intentions, but also from objective aspects of the 
transaction such as the presence vel non of notes or other 
debt instruments, security or collateral, interest charges, 
repayment schedules or deadlines, book entries recording 
loan balances or payments, actual repayments, or any 
other factors indicative of an unconditional obligation to 
repay. See Fin Hay, 398 F.2d at 696; Haag, 88 T.C. at 616. 
The Tax Court acknowledged that in transferring $2.85 
million to the estate, the trusts did not obtain a debt 
instrument or other written promise to repay, did not 
require any collateral or security, did not impose any 
interest charges, did not establish a repayment schedule or 
maturity date, and did not make any entries on their books 
treating the transfers as loans. See Geftman, 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 820-21. In concluding that the transfers 
nonetheless constituted bona fide loans, the court relied 
primarily on the fact that the estate had made $82,764 in 
repayments to the trusts. See id. at 821. 13 However, upon 
analyzing the significance of these repayments and of the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The court also characterized as "objective evidence of indebtedness" 
the January 17, 1984 memorandum and a June 11, 1985"adjusting 
journal entry" referring to a "partial debt settlement" with the trusts. 
Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821. However, such"allegedly objective . . . 
indicia" which merely represent a party's characterization of the 
transaction are unpersuasive "unless supported by objective factors 
demonstrating economic reality." Gilbert v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 60, 65 
(1980). Accordingly, we confine our analysis to the objective 
characteristics of the transfer which bear on its actual terms. 
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other objective attributes of the transaction, wefind that its 
objective characteristics preclude us from upholding the 
Tax Court's conclusion that it gave rise to a bonafide debt. 
 
a. Repayments 
 
The Tax Court found that the estate's repayments to the 
trusts of $82,764 were indicative of a bona fide debt. While 
the court described the repayments as interest "paid to the 
trusts . . . on loans from the trusts to the estate," it 
recognized that the payments constituted "a portion of the 
margin interest charged on the trusts' loan from E.F. 
Hutton," as each of the four repayments corresponded to 
handwritten notations on the prior month's E.F. Hutton 
statement calculating the portion of the E.F. Hutton 
interest charges attributable to the sums advanced to the 
estate. Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821. The fact that the 
estate merely reimbursed the trusts for a portion of interest 
charges that the trusts incurred from a third party belies 
the court's conclusion that the trusts received these 
payments in the capacity of a bona fide creditor. See id.14 
 
Even if the trusts had not owed the $82,764 to the third- 
party lender that provided the capital in this transaction, 
but rather had received that sum from the estate and 
retained it as repayment of principal or as payment of 
interest charged by the trusts themselves, repayment in 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
14. The Commissioner asserts, br. at 34, that the estate was to pay the 
trusts enough to allow the trusts to make a profit after paying the 
interest charged by E.F. Hutton. The Commissioner concedes that no 
documents reflect such an arrangement, and relies solely on testimony 
in which one of the representatives initially made the same assertion, 
but then, when questioned about the lack of records to that effect, 
acknowledged, "I have to be honest with you. . . . My recollection is it 
was done at a profit [for the trusts]," but if the records do not so 
reflect, 
then the trusts were to receive "no less than dollar for dollar" on the 
amounts they were charged by E.F. Hutton. App. at 19. This testimony 
does not support a finding that the trusts were to earn a profit on the 
transactions. While the Tax Court found that the trusts could not have 
made their monthly payments to E.F. Hutton unless they had received 
the payments from the estate, see Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821, this 
fact does not elucidate whether the payments properly may be 
characterized as interest paid on a bona fide debt. 
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that amount would be insufficient to support afinding of a 
bona fide obligation to repay the $2.85 million transferred 
to the estate, since repayments which are insubstantial in 
relation to the amount transferred are not indicative of a 
bona fide debt. In In re Uneco, 532 F.2d 1204, the 
transferee repaid $40,000 on a transfer of $193,090; 
$26,869 on a transfer of $227,571; and $120,728 on a 
transfer of $207,667, representing repayments of 
approximately 21%, 12%, and 58%, respectively, for an 
aggregate repayment of approximately 30% of the total 
amount advanced. The court found these payments 
insufficient to establish that the transferee had an 
unconditional obligation to repay the principal amount 
transferred. See id. at 1204. Thus, a fortiori, the 
repayments in this case of $82,764 on a transfer of $2.85 
million, representing a repayment of only 3% of the total 
amount transferred, cannot be regarded as evidence of a 
bona fide obligation to repay the principal amount 
transferred. 
 
In Gilbert v. Commissioner, 74 T.C. 60, 65-66 (1980), the 
court held that even complete repayment of the amount 
transferred was not indicative of a bona fide debt since the 
repayment occurred after a long period without 
repayments, and thus did not correspond to repayment 
terms or schedules established at the outset of the 
transaction. The pattern of repayments in this case 
similarly does not reveal any established repayment terms 
or schedules, as the estate made the repayments only on 
four occasions from May through August 1984, making no 
other repayments during the period in which it received 
transfers from the trusts. 
 
In Georgiou, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) at 1351, the court found 
that repayments were not probative of a bona fide debt as 
they not only were "insubstantial in relation to the 
advances" but also resulted in "[f]ailure to repay an ever 
mounting loan balance." In this case the insubstantial 
repayments representing only 3% of the amount transferred 
similarly failed to reduce an ever-mounting loan balance 
resulting from the fact that the estate received additional 
transfers of $746,902 during the months in which it made 
the repayments of $82,764. See app. at 184, 178.15 For 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
15. The parties stipulated that "[t]he total borrowing on margin as of 
August 31, 1984 was $2,850,408.34" and that "[a]ll funds that were 
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these reasons, the repayments of $82,764 cannot be 
regarded as evidence of a bona fide debt, in contrast to 
repayments that are "regularly made" and result in "an 
annual net reduction in the balance" by discharging "all 
stated interest charges" and a portion of the principal. See, 
e.g., Litton Bus. Sys., Inc. v. Commissioner , 61 T.C. 367, 
380 (1973).16 Thus, we find that the Tax Court erred in 
characterizing the $82,764 repayments as evidence of a 
bona fide debt. 
 
b. Other Objective Factors 
 
The other objective characteristics of the transaction are 
equally inconsistent with the existence of a bonafide debt. 
While the Tax Court noted that the transfers were not 
accompanied by any notes, interest charges, collateral, 
repayment schedules, or book entries recording a loan 
balance, the court found the absence of these factors 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
borrowed on margin from E.F. Hutton . . . were transferred to the Estate 
from the Trusts." App. at 131. The E.F. Hutton Statements reflect a 
margin loan balance that increased from $2,103,506 as of May 1984 to 
$2,850,408 as of August 1984, see app. at 184, 178, for a total increase 
of $746,902 during that period. Several courts have refused to 
characterize a transfer as a bona fide loan where, as here, the transferor 
did not establish a maximum loan amount but continued transferring 
funds at the transferee's request. See Haag, 88 T.C. 617; Electric & Neon, 
Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 1328-29 (1971), aff 'd, 496 F.2d 876 
(5th Cir. 1974) (table); Roschuni v. Commissioner, 29 T.C. 1193, 1202-04 
(1958), aff 'd, 271 F.2d 267 (5th Cir. 1959). 
 
16. The Tax Court found that the trusts received additional repayments 
when the estate transferred mortgages to the trusts as a "partial debt 
settlement." See Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821. However, as 
discussed more fully below, the trusts never received any beneficial 
interest in the mortgages. Even assuming that the trusts had acquired 
some interest in the mortgages, the June 11, 1985 document making 
adjusting journal entries and characterizing the purported mortgage 
transfer as a partial debt settlement was contradicted by 
contemporaneous documents describing that purported transfer as a 
purchase. See app. at 135c. Thus we find no evidence to support the 
assertion that the trusts received additional repayments in the form of a 
mortgage transfer, and accordingly confine our analysis of the 
repayments to the $82,764 which the trusts actually received. 
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insignificant on the grounds that such features were not 
necessary in transactions between related parties. See 
Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 820-21. To the contrary, 
however, cases examining transactions between related 
parties have found the absence of such factors highly 
significant and have characterized transfers as bona fide 
loans only where the record contains sufficient objective 
evidence of an enforceable obligation to repay and a 
reasonable expectation of repayment. 
 
In Baird v. Commissioner, 43 T.C.M. (CCH) 1173, 1180- 
81 (1982), the court recognized a bona fide debt between 
related parties because the transferee had executed 
promissory notes establishing a payment schedule and 
charging interest at a rate of ten percent, and had delivered 
the notes to the transferor "prior to . . . receiving the 
checks," while the transferor had recorded the 
"disbursements on its books as loans." Similarly, in 
American Processing & Sales Co. v. United States, 371 F.2d 
842 (Ct. Cl. 1967), the court found sufficient evidence of an 
"enforceable obligation to repay" and a "reasonable 
expectation of repayment" in a transaction between related 
corporations, inasmuch as the transferor held a lien on the 
transferee's buildings and fixtures and both corporations 
recorded consistent, definite amounts due on the debt. See 
id. at 845-46, 856-57. 
 
Likewise, in Litton Bus. Sys., 61 T.C. 367, the transferee 
corporation adopted a resolution prior to the transfer 
authorizing the corporation "to borrow" from its parent 
corporation, and at the time of the transfer both the 
transferor and transferee recorded the same "opening 
balance" of the amount owed by the subsidiary. Moreover, 
the "indebtedness and its essential terms" were recorded on 
the books of both companies and in "a substantial amount 
of correspondence" which set forth "the existence of a debt 
obligation, the amount thereof and payments thereon,[and] 
the provision for interest." Furthermore, the interest rate 
was "reasonable[ ] in light of the prevailing interest rates in 
the financial community at that time," the"due date [was] 
within the control of the creditors," and there was a 
"reasonable expectation, at the inception of the 
[transaction], of repayment . . . based on the[transferee's] 
established financial history." See id. at 376-80. 
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The Tax Court cited cases such as Baird, American 
Processing, and Litton for the proposition that the absence 
of certain formalities may be excused when the transferor 
and transferee are related entities. See Geftman , 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 820-21. The court failed to acknowledge, however, 
that although the courts in those cases did not require the 
presence of every possible indicium of indebtedness, they 
did not recognize a debt in the absence of all objective 
indicia, but rather based their recognition of a debt on 
numerous objective factors not present in this case. 17 
 
While the foregoing cases demonstrate that the courts 
have required objective indicia of an obligation to support 
assertions of indebtedness between related parties, perhaps 
more significantly, numerous cases, including those relied 
upon by the Tax Court, have rejected assertions of 
indebtedness between related parties despite the presence 
of significant objective evidence that the transfer was 
intended as a loan. For instance, in Donisi v. Commissioner, 
26 T.C.M. (CCH) 327 (1967), aff 'd, 405 F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 
1968), the court rejected the assertion that a shareholder's 
transfers to his closely held corporation were bonafide 
loans, although the transferee, prior to the transfers, had 
adopted a formal resolution authorizing it to borrow from 
the transferor at specified interest rates, had computed and 
recorded the interest owed on its books, and had made 
several payments designated explicitly as interest owed on 
the loans. The court found these factors insufficient, 
inasmuch as the transferor did not require any "notes or 
other written evidence of indebtedness," and did not 
establish a repayment schedule or obtain any collateral 
although the transferee had assets "of a kind which 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
17. Apart from Baird, American Processing, and Litton, the Tax Court 
cited only one case that characterized a transfer between related parties 
as a bona fide debt. That case also relied on objective factors not 
present 
in this case, such as a duly executed promissory note and consistent 
treatment of the transfer on the parties' books andfinancial statements 
as "loan receivables." See Shaken v. Commissioner, 21 T.C. 785, 793 
(1954). However, the Shaken court's conclusion that the transfers were 
loan repayments also rested in large part on an analysis of factors which 
undermined the Commissioner's assertion in that case that the transfers 
constituted dividends, an analysis that is inapposite in this case. 
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normally are considered excellent security." Id. at 330. 
Thus, in Donisi, although the parties had manifested an 
intent to create a loan through objective factors such as 
contemporaneously stated interest rates and book entries 
consistent therewith, the court found it significant that the 
transferor, like the trusts in this case, did not take readily 
available measures, such as obtaining notes or collateral, to 
ensure repayment. 
 
In Georgiou, 70 T.C.M. (CCH) 1341, the court found that 
transfers from a corporation to its shareholder were not 
bona fide loans, although the corporation had obtained a 
security interest in the shareholder's assets, established a 
fixed maturity date, charged the shareholder interest, 
treated the transfers as loans on its books, and received 
funds back from the shareholder which the corporation 
explicitly designated as loan repayments. Despite these 
objective indicia of indebtedness, the court found that the 
transfers did not give rise to a bona fide debt, since there 
was no indication that the shareholder intended to"enforce 
the debt against himself." Id. at 1351. Thus, contrary to the 
Tax Court's finding that the relatedness of the parties 
obviated the need for objective evidence of indebtedness, 
Georgiou demonstrates that even extensive objective 
evidence may be insufficient to establish the existence of a 
debt where the close relationship between the transferor 
and the transferee leaves the transferor discretion as to 
whether to enforce the debt, rendering any obligation to 
repay conditional rather than unconditional. 
 
Likewise, in Gilbert, 74 T.C. 60, the court rejected the 
assertion that a transfer constituted a bona fide loan 
although "the transfer was consistently treated as a loan on 
the books . . . and balance sheets of both corporations," 
"the check . . . included a notation that it was a loan," and 
the transfer subsequently was repaid in full. Id. at 65. The 
court found that the characterization of the transfer as a 
loan on these documents was unpersuasive, since the 
transferor did not charge interest, obtain a note, require 
collateral, impose a repayment schedule, or take other 
measures to ensure repayment. Moreover, the transferor 
had "borrowed the same money at interest" and had "no 
business purpose . . . to have subsidized" the transferee by 
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" `loaning' the same funds without requiring the payment of 
at least an equivalent rate of interest." Id.  at 66. Finally, the 
transferee's financial difficulties, which raised doubts as to 
whether the transferee "would have funds available to 
repay," demonstrated that the transfer was economically 
unreasonable as a loan transaction and precluded the court 
from recognizing a bona fide indebtedness. Id.  Virtually all 
of the factors that weighed against recognition of a debt in 
Gilbert are present in this case where the trusts borrowed 
funds at interest, transferred them to the estate without 
charging an equal rate of interest and obtaining notes, 
collateral, or repayment schedules, and without any basis 
for believing that the estate would be in a position to repay 
the funds transferred.18 
 
The foregoing cases demonstrate that, contrary to the 
view adopted by the Tax Court, the mere relatedness of the 
parties is not a sufficient basis to support characterization 
of a transaction as a debt in the absence of objective 
evidence of indebtedness such as notes, collateral, 
repayment schedules, interest charges, or other measures 
demonstrating an intent to secure repayment. Rather, these 
cases demonstrate that transfers between related parties 
cannot be characterized as bona fide loans unless the 
totality of the objective evidence reveals that the transferee 
had an enforceable obligation to repay the sums 
transferred. The transactions in this case, which did not 
involve any notes, collateral, repayment schedule, interest 
charges, or book entries reflecting a loan, bear virtually 
none of the objective attributes which denote a bonafide 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
18. The Commissioner argues, br. at 26-27, that Gilbert is 
distinguishable because in this case the trusts earned $82,764 in 
interest whereas in Gilbert the transferor received no interest payments. 
This argument is circular, as the $82,764 cannot be characterized as 
interest earned by the trusts unless the trusts' $2.85 million transfer to 
the estate can be characterized as a bona fide loan based on sufficient 
objective indicia of an intent to secure repayment. The argument also is 
unsupported by the record, as the trusts did not charge any interest but 
merely recovered a portion of the E.F. Hutton interest charges which 
they incurred in obtaining funds for the estate. Because the trusts 
recovered only a portion of the $133,627 in interest they paid to E.F. 
Hutton, see app. at 328, they subsidized the transaction, just as the 
transferor did in Gilbert, with no economic advantage to themselves. 
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loan, and closely resemble transfers which the courts have 
refused to characterize as a genuine loan because the 
transferor failed to take available measures to secure 
repayment.19 Accordingly, wefind that the objective 
attributes of the transactions between the trusts and the 
estate cannot support the Tax Court's conclusion that they 
gave rise to a bona fide indebtedness. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
19. The Tax Court cited several other cases which, like those discussed 
above, refused to characterize transfers between related parties as bona 
fide loans although they bore more objective attributes of a loan than did 
the transfers in this case. See In re Indian Lakes Estates, Inc., 448 F.2d 
574, 578-79 (5th Cir. 1971) (finding that transfer was not a loan in 
economic substance despite issuance of bonds withfixed maturity dates 
and interest rates); Wood Preserving Corp. of Baltimore v. United States, 
233 F. Supp. 600, 605-07 (D. Md. 1964) (finding that advances were not 
bona fide loans, despite notation of debt in ledger, as transferee made no 
enforceable promise to repay and could not have obtained such funds 
"from any reasonable banker on its own credit"), aff 'd, 347 F.2d 117 
(4th Cir. 1965); Electric & Neon, Inc. v. Commissioner, 56 T.C. 1324, 
1328-29 (1971) (holding that disbursements, although recorded on 
books as balance due and although partially repaid, were not bona fide 
loans absent notes, maturity dates or repayment schedules), aff 'd, 496 
F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1974) (table); Astleford v. Commissioner, 33 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 793 (1974) (finding that transfers were not bona fide loans despite 
interest-bearing promissory notes, notes receivable account entered on 
books, and significant repayments), aff 'd , 516 F.2d 1394 (8th Cir. 
1975); 
Chism Ice Cream Co. v. Commissioner, 21 T.C.M. (CCH) 25 (1962) 
(finding that transfer was not bona fide loan despite ledger account 
entitled "note receivable" and eventual repayment of entire balance, 
where no promissory notes were executed or delivered, no interest was 
charged or paid, and no collateral was given), aff 'd, 322 F.2d 956 (9th 
Cir. 1963). 
 
Notably, in each case cited by the Tax Court as well as in virtually 
every other case of which we are aware, it was the taxpayer who sought 
to establish the existence of a bona fide debt while the Commissioner 
contested its existence. In this case, by contrast, the typical positions 
are 
reversed and it is the Commissioner who seeks to prove the existence of 
a genuine indebtedness. The transfer, however, falls far short of the 
standards which the Commissioner has advocated and which the courts 
have adopted in the cases analyzing whether a transfer constitutes a 
debt. 
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c. Economic Reality 
 
Our conclusion that the contemporaneous intent behind 
and the objective attributes of the transaction demonstrate 
that the transaction cannot be characterized as a bona fide 
loan is consistent with the economic realities surrounding 
the relationship between the trusts and the estate, as these 
realities further demonstrate that the transfers did not give 
rise to a reasonable expectation or enforceable obligation of 
repayment. As we explained in Fin Hay Realty Co. v. United 
States, where "the same persons occupy both sides of the 
bargaining table," the form of a transaction"does not 
necessarily correspond to the intrinsic economic nature of 
the transaction, for the parties may mold it at their will" in 
order "to create whatever appearance would be of . . . 
benefit to them despite the economic reality of the 
transaction." Fin Hay, 398 F.2d at 697. Accordingly, where 
the same individuals control both the transferor and the 
transferee, the transaction must be scrutinized according to 
"an objective test of economic reality" to determine its true 
economic nature. Id.20 
 
The Tax Court acknowledged that the " `same persons 
occup[ied] both sides of the bargaining table' " in this case 
since the same individuals served as both trustees of the 
trusts and representatives of the estate. Geftman, 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 821 (quoting Fin Hay, 398 F.2d at 697). As one 
trustee-representative explained, "[t]rustees, personal 
representatives, we did everything as one. I never separated 
it." When questioned as to whether the assets held by the 
trust belonged to the trusts or the estate, this trustee- 
representative testified that he had "no idea." App. at 60- 
61. However, having erroneously cited this common control 
as a basis for disregarding the absence of objective indicia 
of indebtedness, the court did not undertake an analysis of 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
20. The rule in Fin Hay accords with the general principle that tax 
consequences must be determined not from "the form of the 
transaction," but rather from its "true substance." See Diedrich v. 
Commissioner, 457 U.S. 191, 195-96, 102 S.Ct. 2414, 2417-18 (1982); 
Commissioner v. Hansen, 360 U.S. 446, 461, 79 S.Ct. 1270, 1279 (1959); 
Trans-Atlantic Co. v. Commissioner, 469 F.2d 1189, 1193 (1972) 
(requiring that transaction amount to "debt in substance as well as in 
form"). 
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the economic realities surrounding the transaction. See 
Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821. 
 
In analyzing the nature of the advances from the trusts 
to the estate, we cannot ignore the fact that the funds 
which the estate purportedly "borrowed" from the trusts 
were available only because the estate had funded the 
trusts by making the municipal bond transfers just four 
months before the transfers back to the estate began. The 
courts have refused to characterize transfers as debts 
where the purported debtor conveyed its funds to another 
entity over which it retained a degree of control only to 
"borrow" the same funds back a short time later. See, e.g., 
Wilken v. Commissioner, 53 T.C.M. (CCH) 965 (1987) 
(transfers from trusts to taxpayers who had funded the 
trust were not bona fide loans, despite promissory notes 
bearing interest and mortgage securing repayment, since 
taxpayers had retained control over trust assets and thus 
were `borrowing' their own assets in order to generate 
deductible interest payments); Ribisi v. United States, 51 
A.F.T.R.2d (RIA) 83-961 (N.D. Cal. 1983) (transfers from 
trust to taxpayer were not a valid loan, despite promissory 
note, because taxpayer had used trust as "conduit" through 
which it cycled the funds purportedly borrowed), aff 'd, 746 
F.2d 1487 (9th Cir. 1984) (table). 
 
Nor can we disregard the degree of control which the 
estate exercised over the trusts' assets by virtue of the fact 
that the estate retained the right to reclaim any and all 
trust assets for its own purposes at any time. Although the 
estate did not directly and formally recall the $3 million 
municipal bond portfolio to the estate until 1987, it did so 
in economic substance during 1983 and 1984 by having 
the trusts borrow over $2.85 million against these assets 
worth $3 million and transferring the proceeds to the estate 
with no promise to repay or collateral securing repayment. 
The Commissioner contends, br. at 32, that the transfers 
should not be viewed as a de facto recall of trust assets 
because the estate did not issue a formal recall until well 
after the transfers were complete. This argument, however, 
focuses on the form which the representatives gave to the 
transactions rather than their economic reality. Because 
the transfers effectively conveyed back to the estate 
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virtually all of the equity in the trusts' assets, so that the 
proceeds from the eventual sale of the bonds had to be 
used primarily to satisfy the margin debt incurred on behalf 
of the estate, the transfers in essence depleted the equity in 
the trusts' portfolio and thus amounted to a de facto recall. 
 
While the estate's representatives did not characterize the 
transactions as an asset recall, these individuals, who also 
controlled the trusts and were beneficiaries of Trust A, had 
every incentive to obscure the economic reality that the net 
economic effect of the transaction was to return all value of 
the trusts' assets to the estate, inasmuch as these 
individuals were to receive distributions from Trust A only 
to the extent that the trusts generated current net income. 
Although these individuals attempted to characterize the 
transaction as a profitable endeavor for the trusts in their 
capacity as creditors lending funds to the estate, because 
these individuals wielded the "power to create whatever 
appearance would be of . . . benefit to them despite the 
economic reality of the transaction," Fin Hay , 398 F.2d at 
697, we cannot accept this characterization which does not 
accord with the economic reality that the actual effect of 
the transaction was to transfer $2.85 million of the equity 
held by the trusts back to the estate with no assurance 
that the estate intended to repay these sums to the trusts. 
 
A court may ascertain the true nature of an asserted loan 
transaction by measuring the transaction against the 
"economic reality of the marketplace" to determine whether 
a third-party lender would extend credit under similar 
circumstances. Scriptomatic, Inc. v. United States, 555 F.2d 
364, 367-68 (3d Cir. 1977); see also Fin Hay, 398 F.2d at 
697. It is clear that no reasonable third-party lender would 
have extended $2.85 million of credit with no promise of 
repayment, no interest charges, no security, no repayment 
schedule, and no book entries recording a balance due, 
particularly if that entity did not have capital to lend but 
rather had to place its assets at risk to borrow the funds at 
rates of up to 13.25% in order to transfer them to an entity 
that offered no assurance that it would be in afinancial 
position to repay the funds. See app. at 178-98. Because 
this was not a transaction that "the market would accept as 
debt," Scriptomatic, 555 F.2d at 368, wefind that its terms 
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were defined by the relationship between the estate and the 
trusts as donor and beneficiary and not as debtor and 
creditor.21 
 
The Commissioner argues that E.F. Hutton's willingness 
to lend the trusts funds which the trusts then transferred 
to the estate demonstrates that the transaction between the 
trusts and the estate was economically reasonable as a 
debt transaction on the open market. See br. at 33. We 
disagree. E.F. Hutton lent funds to the trusts on terms 
radically different from the terms on which the trusts 
advanced the same funds to the estate. E.F. Hutton 
secured its loans to the trusts with $3 million in municipal 
bonds as collateral, charged the trusts substantial amounts 
of interest, and collected payments monthly. The trusts, by 
contrast, made no attempt to obtain a security interest in 
any of the estate's assets, although the estate had real 
estate holdings that might have served as collateral. 
Moreover, the trusts did not charge the estate interest or 
require regular payments, but rather received only four 
payments in amounts that only partially reimbursed the 
trusts for the costs they incurred in borrowing from E.F. 
Hutton. Thus, the contrasts between E.F. Hutton's loans to 
the trusts, and the trusts' transfers to the estate in fact 
demonstrate that the latter transaction did not create a 
debtor-creditor relationship. 
 
Moreover, the terms on which the trusts transferred the 
funds to the estate differed not only from the terms on 
which third parties would lend those funds, but also from 
the terms on which the trusts lent funds to other related 
parties. Edith Kermer, a trustee and beneficiary of Trust B, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
21. We recognize that credit may be extended between related parties on 
terms that differ from those that would exist on the open market. Thus, 
while the Commissioner is correct, br. at 33, that a transfer need not be 
profitable for the transferor in order to constitute a bona fide loan, in 
this case the transfer was not merely unprofitable in the sense that it 
did 
not generate any interest income for the trusts. Rather, it required the 
trusts to incur substantial costs and risks to their assets with no 
reasonable expectation that even the principal amount would be repaid. 
Under the circumstances, which reveal no obligation to repay and no 
expectation of repayment, we cannot characterize the transaction as a 
bona fide extension of credit. 
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obtained a loan from the trusts by executing a mortgage on 
her home in favor of the trusts and a written agreement to 
repay the trusts by certain dates at an interest rate of one 
percent above the rate charged to the trusts by E.F. 
Hutton. See app. at 416-19. The absence of comparable 
terms surrounding the transfers made to the estate further 
demonstrates that in economic substance these transfers 
were not loans made with a reasonable expectation of 
repayment, but rather were a conveyance of trust assets 
back to an estate which effectively had exercised its right to 
reclaim such assets for its own purposes. 
 
The economic realities surrounding the transaction, the 
objective features of the transfer, and the lack of 
contemporaneous unconditional intent to create an 
enforceable debt all support Geftman's assertion that the 
transactions between the trusts and the estate did not give 
rise to a genuine indebtedness. In the absence of any 
evidence establishing a bona fide debtor-creditor 
relationship between the estate and the trusts, we must 
reject as clearly erroneous the Tax Court's conclusion that 
the $82,764 which the estate paid to the trusts constituted 
taxable interest income earned by the trusts in their 
capacity as creditors rather than non-taxable distributions 
received by the trusts in their capacity as beneficiaries of 
an estate that had no distributable net income. 
 
B. Mortgage Transactions 
 
The Tax Court found that the trusts earned additional 
taxable income in the form of interest paid on the La Playa 
and Blue Grass condominium mortgages. Although Berkley, 
one of the estate's wholly owned corporations, held title to 
these mortgages and collected all mortgage payments, the 
court found that Berkley held the mortgages and processed 
these payments merely as an agent or nominee for the 
trusts who were the beneficial owners of the mortgages. The 
court based its conclusion that the trusts were the 
beneficial owners of the mortgages on an "adjusting journal 
entry" indicating that Berkley had transferred the 
mortgages to the trusts as a "partial debt settlement," and 
on a "work paper" attributing to the trusts the $90,596 in 
mortgage payments which Berkley collected. See Geftman, 
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72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 821-22. Based on these documents, the 
court found that the "trusts clearly owned the . . . 
mortgages," so that the $59,000 which Berkley transferred 
to them constituted taxable interest income generated by 
those mortgages rather than nontaxable transfers from an 
estate with no distributable net income. See id. 22 
 
While it is undisputed that Berkley held title to the 
mortgages at all relevant times and did not formally assign 
them to the trusts, the true ownership of the mortgages 
and the proper attribution of the income derived therefrom 
does not depend on legal title, but rather turns on"actual 
command over the property" and the right to receive the 
"actual benefit" that accrues from ownership. Frank Lyon 
Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561, 572-73, 98 S.Ct. 1291, 
1298 (1978); accord Cepeda v. Commissioner, 67 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 2181, 2183-84 (1994), aff 'd, 56 F.3d 1384 (5th Cir. 
1995) (table). Accordingly, we must determine whether the 
trusts acquired "the benefits and burdens of the incidents 
of ownership" of the mortgages based upon "the objective 
evidence provided by the . . . overt actions" with respect to 
the mortgages. Cordes v. Commissioner, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) 
356, 358 (1994) (citations omitted); accord Frank Lyon Co., 
435 U.S. at 572-73, 98 S.Ct. at 1298. 
 
Upon analyzing these factors, we conclude that, contrary 
to the representations in the adjusting journal entry and 
the work paper, the objective evidence as to control over the 
mortgages and the income derived therefrom clearly 
demonstrates that Berkley and BOP retained all incidents 
of beneficial ownership of the mortgages, precluding 
reliance on the documents cited by the Tax Court. 
 
1. Documentary Evidence 
 
The Tax Court's conclusion that the trusts had acquired 
a beneficial interest in the mortgages rested in significant 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
22. The court initially found that the trusts received $90,596 in mortgage 
interest income, consisting of the entire amount attributed to the trusts 
on the work paper, but corrected its finding on reconsideration in light 
of the stipulation that only $59,000 had been transferred to the trusts. 
See app. at 436-37. 
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part on the June 11, 1985 "adjusting journal entry," which 
was prepared over three months after the trusts' tax year 
ended on February 28, 1985. The adjusting journal entry 
refers only to the La Playa mortgages with no reference to 
the Blue Grass mortgages, contrary to the court'sfinding 
that this document revealed the trusts' ownership of both 
sets of mortgages. See supp. app. at 40. 23 
 
Most significantly, however, records of Berkley and BOP 
prepared during the relevant tax year controvert the 
adjusting journal entry's representation that ownership of 
the mortgages had been transferred to the trusts. A 
document entitled "BOP, Inc. et al Schedule of Real Estate 
Holdings As of January 31, 1985" identifies BOP as the 
owner of the La Playa and Blue Grass mortgages which 
were titled to Berkley. See app. at 408-15. The schedule, 
which contained numerous footnotes explaining the status 
of various properties, contained no notation indicating that 
the trusts held an interest in the La Playa or Blue Grass 
mortgages. While the Commissioner contends that the"et 
al" after BOP's name could be construed to include the 
trusts, the Commissioner relies on the testimony of a 
representative who conceded that he had no knowledge of 
what the "et al" meant. App. at 76-77. We reject the 
Commissioner's suggestion that the schedule of BOP 
holdings can be construed as comprising assets owned by 
the trusts, since the trusts undisputedly held a mortgage 
on the home of Edith Kermer, yet the Kermer mortgage was 
not identified on the list of BOP's holdings. 24 Accordingly, 
we find that this document identifying BOP as the owner of 
the mortgages one month before the end of the tax year 
precludes reliance on the "adjusting journal entry" which, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
23. The Commissioner contends that the adjusting journal entry is 
supported by the minutes of a representatives' meeting held September 
5, 1984, stating that the mortgages had been "bought outright" by the 
trusts. See app. at 135. While the September 1984 document alludes to 
a mortgage transfer, the inconsistency as to whether the mortgages were 
purchased or were transferred to settle a debt undermines the 
Commissioner's assertion that these documents accurately describe a 
transaction that actually occurred. 
 
24. The "et al" apparently refers to BOP's sister corporation Berkley 
which held title to some of the properties identified in the document. 
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six months later, asserted that the mortgages had been 
transferred to the trusts during that tax year. 
 
2. Objective Incidents of Beneficial Ownership 
 
a. Transactions Involving the Mortgages 
 
Even if Berkley and BOP had recorded consistent, 
contemporaneous documents stating that the mortgages 
had been transferred to the trusts, such documents would 
be insufficient to establish the trusts' ownership of the 
mortgages for tax purposes unless the "objective evidence" 
as to the "overt actions" with respect to the mortgages, 
Cordes, 68 T.C.M. (CCH) at 358, demonstrated that the 
trusts enjoyed "actual command" over the mortgages and 
the right to receive the "actual benefit" of owning them. 
Frank Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 572-73, 98 S.Ct. at 1298. The 
Tax Court, in relying on documents reflecting the purported 
mortgage transfer, did not analyze the significance of the 
numerous overt acts in which the mortgages were assigned, 
pledged and sold to third parties. The court thus failed to 
make the essential determination as to which party 
retained actual command over the mortgages and the right 
to receive the benefits of owning them. Upon examination of 
the overt acts involving the mortgages, it becomes apparent 
that, consistent with the schedule reflecting BOP's 
ownership of the mortgages, Berkley and BOP retained 
actual command over the mortgages and the benefits 
flowing therefrom. 
 
Within five days of the June 11, 1985 journal entry 
reflecting the purported mortgage transfer, BOP and 
Berkley, acting jointly, pledged the mortgages to Ohio 
Savings Bank to secure a loan and executed a "Collateral 
Assignment" of the mortgages dated June 16, 1985, which 
they recorded in public records. In the course of this 
transaction, Berkley and BOP held themselves out as the 
"sole and lawful owners" of the mortgages"free and clear of 
any and all claims" and possessing the "full right and 
lawful authority to deliver, pledge, assign, grant, convey 
and transfer" the mortgages. Berkley and BOP used the 
proceeds of the sums borrowed against the mortgages for 
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their own business activities, completing the process of 
hypothecating the mortgages with no participation or 
authorization from the trusts. See app. at 389-97, 133, 29- 
36, 43, 63-68. 
 
One year later, Ohio Savings Bank reassigned the 
mortgages to BOP and Berkley in a written reassignment to 
them in their names, which they recorded in the public 
records with no mention of the trusts. Shortly thereafter, 
Berkley and BOP sold the mortgages to Horowitz Finance 
Corporation and Fleet National Bank, again representing 
themselves as the sole lawful owners, seeking no 
participation from the trusts, and using the proceeds for 
their own purposes. See app. at 29-38, 63-68, 41, 90, 398- 
407.25 
 
These transactions clearly demonstrate that, despite the 
"adjusting journal entry" stating that the trusts owned the 
mortgages, Berkley and BOP had full command over those 
assets and over the beneficial incidents of owning them, 
freely pledging them to obtain credit and selling them to 
raise cash for their own undertakings. Courts have refused 
to recognize purported asset transfers where the assets 
remain within the control of the purported transferor and 
remain subject to claims of the purported transferor's 
creditors, as was the case here where Berkley and BOP 
continued to enter into transactions with respect to the 
mortgages and pledged the mortgages to their creditors. See 
In re Johnson, 88 T.C. 225, 236-37 (rejecting assertion that 
estate had transferred assets where assets remained 
sufficiently within control of estate that they"would not be 
insulated from the claims of [its] creditors"), aff 'd, 838 F.2d 
1201 (2d Cir. 1987); Donisi v. Commissioner, 26 T.C.M. 
(CCH) 327, 331 (1967) (disregarding asset transfer recorded 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
25. Berkley and BOP used a large portion of the proceeds to satisfy their 
debt to Ohio Savings Bank and used the remainder to pursue their real 
estate endeavors. While one of the estate's representatives asserted that 
the trusts had authorized the various dispositions of the mortgages, he 
conceded that all relevant documents referred only to the estate, Berkley 
and BOP. See supp. app. at 12-16. In light of the substantial evidence 
of transactions carried out exclusively by Berkley and BOP, the record 
cannot support a finding that the trusts exercised any control over the 
decisions with respect to the mortgages. 
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on books where purported transferor subsequently"took 
out two loans using the [assets] as collateral"), aff 'd, 405 
F.2d 481 (6th Cir. 1968).26 Because Berkley and BOP 
retained all incidents of beneficial ownership including the 
power to pledge the mortgages as collateral, sell them to 
third parties and retain the proceeds of these transactions 
while the trusts did not enjoy any of these incidents of 
ownership, we find that the objective evidence of actual 
control over the mortgages precludes a finding that the 
trusts were the true owners of the mortgages. See Frank 
Lyon Co., 435 U.S. at 572-73, 98 S.Ct. at 1298. 27 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
26. The Commissioner contends, br. at 38, that this case is 
distinguishable from Johnson because Berkley paid the trusts $59,000 of 
the income generated by the mortgages, thus providing an objective act 
to corroborate the purported transfer of beneficial ownership. We 
disagree. The very issue in dispute is whether the $59,000 transferred to 
the trusts can be characterized as interest income generated by the 
mortgages, since in the absence of evidence that the trusts owned and 
controlled the mortgages, the transfers from the estate cannot be 
characterized as mortgage interest income. In this case, as in Johnson, 
there is no evidence that the trusts assumed the right to control the 
mortgages as suggested in book entries. Thus the transfer of $59,000 is 
immaterial. 
 
27. The Commissioner argues, br. at 37-38, that the hypothecation and 
sale of the mortgages to third parties should be accorded "minimal 
weight" because they occurred after the end of the relevant tax year. We 
disagree, and find Berkley's and BOP's complete control of the mortgages 
as of June 16, 1985, highly probative of the locus of control during the 
tax year ended February 28, 1985, especially since the record contains 
no indication of any intervening change in the status of the mortgages. 
The Commissioner's argument is particularly unpersuasive in light of the 
Commissioner's extensive reliance on the journal entry dated June 11, 
1985, as evidence bearing on ownership during the tax year ended 
February 28, 1985. The Commissioner also asserts that Berkley's and 
BOP's dispositions of the mortgages are irrelevant because they involved 
"nothing more than transfer of bare legal title." Br. at 38. However, as 
the estate's representatives conceded, in pledging the mortgages as 
collateral to Ohio Savings Bank, Berkley and BOP placed the value of the 
mortgages directly at risk in the event of a default, see app. at 47, 69-
70, 
123, 170-71, and in selling the mortgages Berkley and BOP relinquished 
all control over them. There is nothing in the record to support the 
assertion that these transfers involved only the bare legal title of the 
mortgages. 
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b. Control Over Mortgage Income 
 
Berkley's control over the revenues generated by the 
mortgages further demonstrates that the trusts did not 
hold the incidents of beneficial ownership of the mortgages. 
Contrary to the Tax Court's finding that Berkley merely 
"serviced" the mortgages by collecting mortgage payments 
and forwarding them to the trusts, see Geftman , 72 T.C.M. 
(CCH) at 821, the record clearly demonstrates that Berkley 
retained exclusive control over the mortgage payments 
which it collected without accountability to the trusts. The 
only document indicating that Berkley collected the 
mortgage payments on behalf of the trusts consists of a 
single page, which the court described as a "work paper," 
id. at 822, listing cumulative totals of the payments made 
on the La Playa and Blue Grass mortgages through 
December 31, 1985, and through the end of fiscal year 
1985, and attributing these cumulative amounts to the 
trusts. See supp. app. at 39. As one of the estate's 
representatives conceded, the cumulative nature of this 
document reveals that it could not have been prepared 
before December 31, 1985, see supp. app. at 33, ten 
months after the close of the trusts' fiscal year. 
 
In contrast to this document retrospectively attributing a 
cumulative amount to the trusts, the documents prepared 
during the tax year in the ordinary course of Berkley's 
business did not attribute to the trusts any of the mortgage 
payments which Berkley collected. See app. at 329-34. 
These documents accounting for each mortgage payment 
received, with no reference to the trusts' purported interest 
therein, undermine the Commissioner's assertion that 
Berkley "accounted for the interest received on the La Playa 
and Blue Grass condominiums as having been received on 
account of the trusts." Br. at 37.28  In the absence of any 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
28. In support of this assertion, the Commissioner cites only the "work 
paper" prepared after the end of the tax year and the testimony of one 
of the representatives who conceded that he was"not familiar with the 
books" in which Berkley accounted for the mortgage payments it 
collected. App. at 78. This evidence cannot support a finding that 
Berkley accounted for the mortgage payments as having been received 
on behalf of the trusts, particularly since the documents recorded during 
the tax year do not reflect such a practice. 
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contemporaneous documents attempting to account for the 
trusts' purported mortgage income separately from 
Berkley's other income, the single document retrospectively 
characterizing a cumulative amount as income to the trusts 
fails to establish that the trusts enjoyed a beneficial interest 
in that income. 
 
Berkley's handling of the actual funds received further 
undermines the Commissioner's assertion that Berkley 
merely processed payments belonging to the trusts. While 
Berkley collected regular monthly mortgage payments 
whose total amount increased steadily as additional 
condominium units were sold at the La Playa and Blue 
Grass developments, see app. at 99, Berkley's transfers to 
the trusts did not correspond to the amounts purportedly 
received on their behalf, but rather occurred at irregular 
intervals and in haphazard, fluctuating, and sometimes 
nominal amounts, which, as Geftman accurately notes, 
"bore no reasonable relationship to the regular remittance 
of monthly principal and interest payments which would 
have been received by a legitimate mortgage servicing 
company." Br. at 41.29 
 
Significantly, Berkley forwarded to the trusts only 
$59,000 of the $90,596 which it later characterized as 
payments collected on behalf of the trusts. As 
representative Love explained, Berkley had no obligation to 
forward the mortgage payments to the trusts each month, 
but rather remitted the money "as we saw fit, as we needed 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
29. The transfers occurred as follows: 
 
       Oct. 17, 1984          $12,000 
       Nov. 9, 1984           $ 5,000 
       Jan. 4, 1985           $25,000 
       Jan. 29, 1985          $ 1,000 
       Feb. 5, 1985           $14,000 
       Feb. 14, 1985          $ 1,000 
       Feb. 20, 1985          $ 1,000 
                              _______ 
       Total                  $59,000. 
 
Although the trusts' ledger contained accounts for recording interest 
income, the trusts did not record the $59,000 as such, but rather 
recorded this sum in an account simply entitled"Berkley Mtg. Corp." See 
app. at 384-85. 
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the cash to run the business." App. at 102. This testimony 
reveals that Berkley did not function merely as a nominee 
or agent processing payments on behalf of its principal, but 
rather was free to use the money it collected as it saw fit to 
further its own business purposes. Berkley's full control 
over the income from the mortgages demonstrates that 
Berkley, rather than the trusts, enjoyed this incident of 
beneficial ownership. 
 
As the Tax Court acknowledged, "[t]he owner of property 
is the one who will reap the benefits of ownership." 
Geftman, 72 T.C.M. (CCH) at 822. In this case, the trusts 
did not hold title to the mortgages, did not participate in 
transactions pledging them as collateral and selling them, 
did not receive any of the proceeds from those transactions, 
and did not have control over the monthly mortgage 
payments which Berkley collected and retained for its own 
business purposes, forwarding funds to the trusts only 
when it chose to do so. In light of this evidence that the 
trusts did not enjoy any of the incidents of beneficial 
ownership of the mortgages and that the mortgages 
remained within the exclusive control of Berkley and BOP, 
we find that the Tax Court clearly erred in concluding, 
based on an adjusting journal entry and a work paper 
prepared well after the close of the tax year, that the trusts 
were the true owners of the mortgages. Because the trusts 
did not hold any beneficial interest in the mortgages, we 
must reject the Tax Court's conclusion that the $59,000 
transferred to the trusts constituted taxable mortgage 
interest income earned by the trusts as owners of the 
mortgages rather than non-taxable transfers from an estate 
that had no distributable net income. 
 
C. Effect on Appellant's Tax Liability 
 
Section 662(b) of the Internal Revenue Code provides that 
income which is taxable in the hands of a trust is taxable 
in the hands of the trust's beneficiary. Thus, when a trust 
receives both taxable and non-taxable income, the trust's 
distributions to its beneficiaries are treated as consisting of 
both taxable and non-taxable elements, in the same 
proportion as the taxable and non-taxable elements of the 
trust's net income. See 26 U.S.C. S 662(b); Treas. Reg. 
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S 1.662(b)-1. The Tax Court found that 36% of the 
distribution to Geftman was taxable, based on its 
conclusion that 36% of Trust C's net income consisted of 
taxable interest income generated by the margin 
transactions and the La Playa and Blue Grass mortgages, 
while the remainder consisted of tax-exempt income earned 
on the trusts' municipal bonds. See app. at 436-38.30 
 
However, for the reasons discussed above, we find that 
the Tax Court erred in characterizing the transfers to the 
trusts of $82,764 in connection with the E.F. Hutton 
margin transaction and $59,000 in connection with the 
mortgages as taxable income. Because these amounts were 
not paid to the trusts as a bona fide creditor or a bona fide 
holder of the mortgages, the transfers can be characterized 
only as non-taxable distributions from an estate which had 
no distributable net income, rendering all of the trusts' 
income, and thus all of the distribution to Geftman, non- 
taxable. See 26 U.S.C. S 652(a); Treas. Reg. S 1.652(a)-2(b). 
 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the Tax Court's 
decision holding Geftman liable for an income tax 
deficiency, as the distribution from Trust C which gave rise 
to the finding of a deficiency consisted entirely of non- 
taxable income. Consequently, we will vacate the Tax 
Court's imposition of additions to tax pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
SS 6651 and 6654, as the court's application of these 
provisions rested on its finding of an underlying income tax 
liability. We will remand the matter to the Tax Court for 
entry of a decision in accordance with this opinion and for 
such other proceedings as may be appropriate. 
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30. For an explanation of the calculations underlying this 36% figure, see 
note 7, supra. 
 
                                38 
